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Islam Instrumentalized: Religion and Politics 
in Historical Perspective. By Jean-Philippe 
Platteau. Cambridge Studies in Economics, 
Choice, and Society. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xvii, 
528. $34.99, paper. ISBN 978–1–107–15544–2, 
cloth; 978–1–316–60900–2, pbk. 
JEL 2017–1718
Political institutions across the Muslim world 
have been relatively unstable, autocratic, and cor-
rupt since World War II. One ubiquitous feature 
of these institutions—from Iran to Saudi Arabia 
to North Africa to South Asia—is that rulers use 
Islam to justify their rule in the face of opposi-
tion or popular discontent. How can we account 
for this? Is there something unique about Islam 
and its institutions? What are the historical chan-
nels through which these seemingly stylized facts 
arose? Jean-Philippe Platteau addresses these 
questions, and many more, in his wide-ranging, 
highly learned book, Islam Instrumentalized. 
His primary thesis, which builds off of theoret-
ical work published with Emmanuelle Auriol 
(Auriol and Platteau 2017), is that the decentral-
ized nature of Islam means that rulers looking to 
legitimize their rule via religion have to garner 
the support of a sufficiently large fraction of the 
religious establishment, offering them perks in 
return (such as high-salaried bureaucratic jobs). 
Yet, it is generally not worth it for Muslim rul-
ers to “instrumentalize” the most extreme reli-
gious clerics, whose desires are not aligned with 
those of the ruler, and thus these clerics serve as 
a potential opposition force that contributes to 
the instability of the regime. This is in contrast 
to Catholicism, which for centuries prior to the 
Reformation was the centralized, dominant reli-
gion of Europe. The centralization of medieval 
Christianity meant that rulers had to negotiate 
with only one cleric (the pope or perhaps a power-
ful local archbishop) and the rest of the hierarchy 
would fall in line. This created greater stability 
in European polities, since there was no group of 
outsider clerics who could potentially undermine 
the regime’s stability. In Platteau’s words (p. 154), 
“the autocrat’s decisions are driven by the aver-
age cleric under a centralized religious structure, 
whereas they are driven by the marginal cleric 
under a decentralized one.”
Islam Instrumentalized attempts to tease out 
the implications of Islam’s decentralized insti-
tutions. Platteau quickly dismisses alternative 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (December 2018)1602
institutional theories based on the idea that rule 
in Muslim states is intrinsically bound to Islam, 
as famously suggested by Bernard Lewis (2002). 
Instead, he argues that religion has, since the 
generation after Muhammad, been subservi-
ent to politics, being instrumentalized to serve 
the needs of the politically powerful. Platteau 
is almost certainly correct that Islamic religious 
institutions have historically been subservient to 
the political class, and he raises the important 
point that Muslim political elites and religious 
elites should be viewed as two distinct sets of 
actors. Indeed, since the first few caliphs, reli-
gion has played an important role in legitimating 
Muslim political power, even if rulers themselves 
were not overly pious. Most Muslim rulers, espe-
cially those with weak claims to religious power 
(either as non-Arabs or lacking in bloodlines to the 
Prophet, as was the case with the Ottomans) relied 
on the religious establishment, rather than sim-
ply claiming all religious power unto themselves. 
Thus, Platteau’s conception of religious authorities 
being instrumentalized as part of a broader polit-
ical equilibrium is useful for understanding much 
of the historical and contemporary politics of the 
Muslim world. Indeed, Platteau suggests that 
his theory provides the political complement to 
Kuran’s (2011) argument in The Long Divergence, 
which focused on aspects of Islamic law as the 
root of the economic divergence between Western 
Europe and the Islamic world. 
Platteau provides significant and impres-
sive narrative support for his argument. The 
reader is provided with historical and contem-
porary accounts from almost everywhere in the 
Islamic world: the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal 
Empires, Afghanistan, Turkey, Sudan, Pakistan, 
Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
India, Tunisia, Morocco, and more. These case 
studies are hardly glossed over. Almost every 
one involves in-depth historical and contempo-
rary analyses of the role that Islam has played 
in politics. For this reason alone, it is impossible 
to come away from this book without learning 
something, no matter how well-versed one is in 
the political and economic histories of the Islamic 
world. Platteau’s command of these histories is 
impressive, and they are quite usefully employed 
to show how different equilibrium outcomes can 
arise in an Islamic political setting. For instance, 
Platteau skillfully uses insights from postcolonial 
Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Syria, Palestine, and Malaysia to show how the 
Muslim religious establishment can be instru-
mentalized in support of kleptocratic regimes. In 
each of these cases, cynical rulers used Islam as a 
readily available instrument of ideology in order 
to implement corrupt regimes. Meanwhile, the 
twentieth-century histories of Turkey, Tunisia, 
and Afghanistan are employed to show how an 
“enlightened despot” equilibrium might emerge 
in an Islamic setting, and why this can ultimately 
lead to a rise in Islamist politics.
There is much to like in Platteau’s theory. Very 
little theoretical work in the economics of reli-
gion or the economics of Islam has focused on the 
consequences of (Sunni) Islam’s decentralized 
institutional structure. His (and Auriol’s) theory 
of “religious seduction” thus helps make sense 
of numerous aspects of Muslim political econ-
omy. Yet, it is for this reason that the reader may 
leave the book wanting more. Platteau spends 
the bulk of the book (chapters 5–9, which com-
prise over 250 pages) on a variety of case stud-
ies, even venturing outside the Islamic world to 
analyze the role of religion in Hindu, Sikh, and 
Buddhist revival movements. While the reader 
will learn much from these chapters, the role 
that the decentralization of Islamic institutions 
plays in these various histories is almost absent 
from the discussion. What is made quite clear is 
that Muslim religious authorities are frequently 
“instrumentalized” for political ends. But this 
stylized fact could also be indicative of Islam 
simply being better at legitimating rule than 
other religions. Platteau dismisses this idea, 
instead arguing that (p. 144) “regarding the polit-
ical instrumentalization of religion, it is hard to 
detect substantial differences between Islam and 
Christianity.” Yet, the evidence put forth is sim-
ply that Europeans also instrumentalized religion 
to legitimate their regimes. This is correct, but it 
does not necessarily follow that the relationship 
is the same in the two religions. Religious legiti-
macy is inexpensive, and it will be used as long as 
its benefits outweigh its costs. Just because rulers 
of both religions instrumentalized religion does 
not mean its benefits were the same.
There is plenty of Islamic doctrine, some cited 
by Platteau, which indicates this Islam is more 
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effective than Christianity at legitimating rule. 
Numerous hadith (important religious traditions) 
suggest that rulers should be obeyed unless they 
disobey Allah. And, of course, religious author-
ities are tasked with determining what involves 
disobedience to Allah (Rubin 2017). This makes 
them attractive to “seduce,” especially when the 
ruler desires to implement a controversial policy 
or act like an autocrat. It is thus unclear, theoret-
ically, that decentralization of religious authority 
is the salient reason for the widespread use of 
Muslim religious authorities in legitimating rule. 
Moreover, the vast set of case studies Platteau 
provides do not do much to bolster the impor-
tance of decentralization, as it is rarely discussed. 
It is possible, even likely, that both the relative 
effectiveness of Muslim religious legitimacy and 
the decentralization of Muslim religious institu-
tions have played decisive roles is contributing to 
political economy outcomes. Yet, the sole focus 
on decentralization also leaves important ques-
tions unanswered. For instance, if centralization 
of religious authority helped create stability in 
medieval Christian polities, why did religious 
legitimation begin to wane in the late medieval 
and early modern periods in Europe? Why were 
the same dynamics Platteau finds in Muslim 
political history not found in Protestant political 
history? (Platteau does address this issue, not-
ing that Islam and Protestant faiths had certain 
similarities, including numerous puritan and fun-
damentalist movements; that said, their political 
economy outcomes are strikingly different). 
Yet, none of these issues should detract too much 
from the importance of Islam Instrumentalized. 
The intersection of politics and religion is cen-
tral to all types of outcomes in the Islamic world, 
and it must be grappled with by any social sci-
entist interested in the region. Platteau’s book is 
an important addition to this literature, both for 
its theory relating decentralized religious insti-
tutions to political economy outcomes and for its 
wide-ranging use of case studies. Scholars of East 
Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North 
Africa will all find many useful ideas and theo-
retical insights applicable to their region of inter-
est. The sheer amount of detail Platteau provides 
from history and the present from around the 
world is an impressive achievement in itself, and 
it makes for an enjoyable read. Readers will learn 
much from this learned book.
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